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policy also represents the most practical and feasible way to accommodate the internationalizing
pressure of globalization with a continuing federal system of "dual sovereignties." Under this
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2004, the office of Governor Brad Henry of Oklahoma became the
unlikely focal point of relations between Mexico and the United States.
Osbaldo Torres, a Mexican national convicted of multiple murders by
Oklahoma courts, was scheduled to be executed on May 18. Not only was the
Mexican government urgently lobbying the governor's office on Torres's
behalf, but the Governor was also considering a judgment issued by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) purporting to require him to suspend
Torres's execution and to order a new hearing to consider the effect of treaty
violations on Torres's conviction and sentence.' At the same time, attorneys for
Torres were urgently seeking an order from Oklahoma's highest court of
criminal appeals to stay the execution based on the ICJ's order.'
On the morning of May 13, the Oklahoma court suspended the execution
and ordered a new hearing pursuant to the ICJ judgment.' A few hours later,
Governor Henry announced at a press conference that he had commuted
Torres's sentence to life imprisonment, thereby removing most of the legal
basis for Torres's appeal under the ICJ judgment.
4
As the Governor, the state's highest criminal court, the Mexican
government, and the ICJ struggled to resolve Torres's fate, one entity was
curiously absent: the U.S. federal government. According to news reports, the
State Department had contacted Governor Henry's office but had merely urged
him to consider the ICJ's judgment.5 The federal government did not intervene
in the litigation in the Oklahoma state courts. The Governor was not ordered
by the President to commute Torres's sentence. Rather, the Governor exercised
his own discretion in making that decision.6
1. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) (Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Avena
Judgment], available at http://www.ic-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm
(follow "Judgment" hyperlink).
2. For a narrative of the facts surrounding the Torres decision, see Sean D. Murphy,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 579,
581-82 (2004).
3. Torres v. State, 43 I.L.M. 1227 (2004) (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (granting a stay of
execution and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing).
4. See Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants Clemency to Death
Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.governor.state.ok.us (search
for "Osbaldo Torres"); see also John Greiner, Henry Commutes Death Sentence, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, May 14, 2004, at Ai.
5. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 582.
6. See Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, supra note 4, at 1.
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The President's passivity is surprising because it is an axiom of U.S. foreign
relations law that the President is the leading authority, perhaps even the "sole
organ, ''7 for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, it is nearly as
axiomatic that state governments are not granted an independent role in
conducting foreign policy.8 Yet in this case, a potentially important diplomatic
issue was left entirely to the discretion of the Governor of Oklahoma and the
Oklahoma state courts. Indeed, although the State Department issued
statements in previous ICJ cases involving similar issues, none of the
statements "ordered" or "commanded" the governors in those cases; each
governor made an independent decision about whether and how to comply
with the ICJ's judgments.9
To be sure, in a subsequent case involving the effect of the same ICJ
judgment on a Texas execution, the President intervened by releasing a
memorandum purporting to order the Texas courts to follow the ICJ's
judgment.1" The constitutionality of this order will be tested in the near future,
but even if upheld, it applies only to state courts, and not to governors.1' For a
variety of reasons, both legal and political, state governors will retain some
measure of independent discretion to exercise their powers in ways that might
affect and indeed determine aspects of U.S. foreign policy.
Governors exercise this limited but important foreign policy power in a
variety of contexts. In addition to the power to respond to requests by foreign
governments and international institutions, governors also negotiate and
execute certain kinds of international agreements in pursuit of regional or
international cooperation. Governors and other state executive officials
administer insurance regulations and state purchasing regulations in pursuit of
certain foreign policy goals. In these admittedly limited but hardly
unimportant areas, a gubernatorial foreign policy is beginning to emerge.
My goal in this Essay is to redirect the existing academic conversation on
state governments and foreign affairs. While scholars have considered the legal
7. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("Plainly, the external powers of
the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies.").
9. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51
STAN. L. REV. 529, 532-38 (1999); Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist: How States
Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REv. 457, 512-14 (2004) (describing the
State Department's careful non-binding communications to governors in the wake of the
ICJ's previous decisions).
1o. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 66o, 663 (2005) (per curiam) (quoting Memorandum from
George W. Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005)).
n1. Id.
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and policy consequences of state activities in foreign affairs,1 2 they have not
considered the unique role of governors in the state foreign policy process. Nor
have scholars considered the usefulness of a governor-led system of state
foreign policy as an accommodation between the forces of globalization and the
domestic federal system.
My discussion proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces and defines a
system of gubernatorial foreign policy. Part II argues that notwithstanding the
traditional understanding of exclusive federal control over foreign affairs,
existing constitutional doctrine still permits states to exercise limited
independence in matters affecting foreign affairs. I conclude in Part III that this
system of gubernatorial foreign policy represents the most practical and
feasible accommodation of the forces of globalization and a system of dual
sovereignties envisioned by the U.S. constitutional structure.
I. A SYSTEM OF GUBERNATORIAL FOREIGN POLICY
In this Part, I introduce and define a system of gubernatorial foreign policy.
I then examine three examples of this system in action.
A. Defining a Gubernatorial Foreign Policy
Executive officials of a particular state often take actions that implicate the
foreign relations of the United States as a whole. Such actions become a
"gubernatorial foreign policy" when a governor or other state executive official
takes that action independent of federal government supervision or control.13
The level of gubernatorial independence from the federal government,
however, varies depending on the situation.
12. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Jr., The Constitutionality of State and Local
"Sanctions"Against Foreign Countries: Affairs of State, States'Affairs, or a Sorry State ofAffairs?,
26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307 (1999) (arguing that state foreign affairs activities are
unconstitutional); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understanding of Foreign Affairs Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341 (1999) (describing
the original understanding of the role of states in foreign affairs).
13. For my purposes, the term "gubernatorial" encompasses not only actions taken by a state's
chief executive, or governor, but also actions taken by independent state executive officials
such as state attorneys general or state insurance commissioners. As Professor Marshall
points out in his essay in this Symposium, William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?
Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446
(2oo6), many attorneys general are themselves independently elected. City officials might
also qualify as state executive officials on the theory that they act as agents for the state.
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In some cases, governors act with the full acquiescence of the federal
government to deal with a matter implicating foreign affairs. In these
instances, governors act at the height of their foreign policy powers because the
federal government has expressly endorsed their activities. In other cases,
gubernatorial activities are taken without either express approval or opposition
by the federal government. Because the federal government's views are often
uncertain on foreign policy matters facing governors, many of the
gubernatorial foreign policy activities I describe belong to this second category.
Finally, certain gubernatorial activities are taken with the express disapproval
of the federal government. In these circumstances, the governors' foreign
policy powers are highly restricted. As I will argue in Part II, however, there are
a few circumstances in which a governor's decision on how to proceed is
constitutionally protected from federal control.
Not all gubernatorial foreign policy activities have the same legal character.
Like exercises of the federal executive's foreign policy power, exercises of a state
executive's foreign policy power take place within a complex and uncertain web
of legal authorizations, prohibitions, and limitations. Some of these activities
might be said to encroach upon federal powers, while others might be
constitutionally shielded from federal control. But all represent an important
and insufficiently studied component of the foreign policy system of the
United States.
B. Examples of Gubernatorial Foreign Policy
In this Section, I review three examples of gubernatorial foreign policy in
action. First, governors engage in foreign policy when they take primary
responsibility for responding to demands by foreign governments and
international institutions. Second, governors engage in foreign policy when
they negotiate and sign international and regional agreements on behalf of
their states. Finally, governors and other members of a state's executive branch
take foreign policy actions when they impose sanctions or other economic
limitations on doing business with particular foreign countries. Each type of
gubernatorial foreign policy reflects some level of independence from federal
government control.
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1. Responding to Demands by Foreign Governments and International
Institutions
States have always played an important role in responding to demands by
foreign governments and international institutions.' 4 The most dramatic
examples of this role can be found in conflicts between the state administration
of capital punishment and the United States' international obligations. These
conflicts highlight the central position that governors hold when dealing with
demands by foreign governments and international organizations.
The administration of capital punishment by the states has drawn intense
criticism from foreign governments as well as from international institutions. '5
Aside from general moral disapproval, foreign critics have also alleged that the
death penalty violates certain U.S. obligations under international law. As
discussed below, these international obligations provide foreign governments
and international institutions with a basis for demanding a change in U.S.
death penalty practices.
Although the challenged death penalty practices implicate the obligations
of the entire United States, the federal government has generally referred both
foreign governments and international institutions to a particular state's
governor. For example, between 1997 and 2003, Mexico filed diplomatic notes
in at least twenty capital cases involving its nationals on death row in the
United States. 16 These notes protested the failure of the United States to
comply with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations when arresting the Mexican nationals.'
7
14. See Ku, supra note 9, at 488-89 (discussing Texas's interpretation of international law).
15. See Nora V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead?,
81 OR. L. REv. 131, 139-50 (2002) (discussing European views of U.S. capital punishment
practices).
16. See Memorial of Mexico, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 140 (June
20, 2003) [hereinafter Avena Memorial], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imusframe.htm (follow "Written Pleadings" hyperlink).
17. Id. 154. The Vienna Convention obligates signatories to inform the consulates of foreign
states whenever the nationals of those states are taken into custody and to notify those
nationals of their right to consular assistance. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art.
36, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. The Convention's
Optional Protocol provides that all disputes "arising out of the interpretation or application
of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice." Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations].




The federal government's official response to these notes is not publicly
available, but according to Mexico, the responses offered nothing more than
diplomatic apologies for the failure to comply with treaty obligations when
arresting the Mexican nationals.'8 In some cases, the federal government also
forwarded the diplomatic notes directly to the governors of the states where the
violations had occurred. ' 9 The governors who received these notes, however,
generally rejected the Mexican protests and defended their right to arrest and
eventually execute the Mexican nationals in question. In one case, the Governor
of Texas received a personal communication from the President of Mexico, and
the Secretary of State of Texas received a personal visit from Mexico's
diplomatic representatives."
In addition to foreign governments, international institutions have also
requested or even demanded that the United States suspend death sentences
imposed on both U.S. and foreign nationals. For instance, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the human rights arm of the
Organization of American States (OAS),21 has issued a number of requests
seeling the suspension of executions alleged to violate U.S. obligations under
international human rights law. 2 A number of these formal requests have been
sent directly to state governors, however, rather than to the federal
government. For instance, in 1993 the IACHR sent a request directly to the
Governor of Texas requesting that the Governor stay the execution of U.S.
18. Avena Memorial, supra note 16, 140-155.
19. See, e.g., id. 151 (asserting that the federal government forwarded a diplomatic note from
Mexico to Texas authorities).
20. Id. 154.
21. The Organization of American States is the world's oldest regional organization. It counts as
members thirty-five states in the Western Hemisphere. See Cong. Research Serv.,
Organization of American States: A Primer (May i1, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RS22o95.pdf. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is
empowered under the OAS Charter to issue reports and investigate complaints of violations
of international human rights obligations by OAS members. See Charter of the Organization
of American States art. 1o6, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/charter.htmi ("[The IACHR's] principal function shall
be to promote the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative
organ of the Organization in these matters.").
22. See, e.g., Ronan Doherty, Note, Foreign Affairs v. Federalism: How State Control of Criminal
Law Implicates Federal Responsibility Under International Law, 82 VA. L. REv. 1281, 1320 (1996)
(noting that after Texas authorities refused the IACHR's request of a delay of execution,
Carlos Santana was executed on March 23, 1993); Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm'n on
Human Rights, No. 17/oo (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/
English/20oo/Pressx7-oo.htm (noting that the United States twice failed to respond to the
IACHR's request to stay the execution of Miguel Flores pending its review of Flores's
petition regarding the United States' violation of his consular rights).
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citizen Gary Graham pending a full JACHR investigation of Graham's claim
that his rights had been violated. The Governor of Texas, Ann Richards,
responded directly to the LACHR note and indicated that under Texas law she
could no longer extend clemency. When the IACHR sent another request, this
time directed to the federal government, the federal government did little more
than forward correspondence from Texas executive officials concerning the
Graham case.23
Even though the IACHR did not claim that the United States was violating
its obligations under international law, its communications still could have
given rise to a foreign policy question for the United States. Relations with the
LACHR may affect the U.S. government's relations with the OAS and the other
member states of the OAS. Despite the salient foreign policy question, the
federal government appears to have left the ultimate decision of how to
respond to the IACHR's requests to the discretion of the Governor of Texas.
The existence of a gubernatorial foreign policy in this context is even more
apparent in a trilogy of cases brought against the United States in the
International Court of Justice, challenging state executions of foreign nationals
as violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. While the
international and domestic legal issues raised by these cases have received
plenty of scholarly attention,25 far less attention has been paid to the central
role that state governors played in relations between the United States and the
IcJ.
Paraguay brought the first ICJ case in a last-minute attempt to stop the
execution of one of its nationals, Angel Breard, by the Commonwealth of
Virginia.26 At Paraguay's request, the ICJ issued a provisional measures order
23. See Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, No. 9/oo (June 28, 2000),
available at http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2ooo/Press9-oo.htm. This back-
and-forth correspondence continued until 2000, when the IACHR's final, last-minute
request to the federal government to stop the execution was again forwarded by the federal
government to the Governor of Texas.
24. Avena Judgment, supra note 1; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (June 27, 2001), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (follow "Judgment" hyperlink);
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9)
(provisional measures order).
2S. See, e.g., Jonathan 1. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard: The Facts, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 666 (1998).
26. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1998 I.C.J. 248.
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requiring the United States to suspend Breard's execution so that the ICJ could
consider the full case. 7
While the legal status of the ICJ's order is both important and interesting,28
it is the interplay between the ICJ, the U.S. State Department, and the
Governor of Virginia that best illustrates the system of a gubernatorial foreign
policy. The ICJ's provisional measures order was sent to the State Department,
and the State Department's only action was to forward the order to the
Governor of Virginia, along with a letter from the Secretary of State. 9 The
Secretary's letter, however, did not purport to require the Governor of Virginia
to comply with the ICJ's provisional measures order. Rather, the letter simply
"requested" that the Governor stay the execution pending the ICJ's final
judgment.3" Because the U.S. courts did not treat the order as enforceable, the
final decision of whether to suspend the execution per the ICJ's provisional
order amounted to a foreign policy decision by the Governor of Virginia. The
Governor, James Gilmore, decided to execute Breard rather than defer to the
wishes of the ICJ and the government of Paraguay.31
A year later, Governor Jane Dee Hull of Arizona faced a similar foreign
policy decision when the ICJ issued a nearly identical provisional measures
order in favor of two German nationals facing execution. Perhaps learning
from its previous experience, the ICJ's provisional measures order was directed
both to the Governor of Arizona and to the U.S. federal government. 2 Upon
receiving the ICJ's provisional measures order, the U.S. government simply
forwarded the ICJ order to the Governor without requesting any particular
action, thus leaving the final decision in the Governor's hands. Like her
27. Id. at 258. The order was the subject of substantial litigation in U.S. federal courts, and the
U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the provisional order could not be enforced in a
federal habeas action. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).
28. See Julian G. Ku, International Delegations and the New World Court Order, 81 WASH. L. REv.
1, 41-57 (2006) (discussing the domestic legal status of the ICJ judgment as well as the legal
status of other international tribunal judgments).
29. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 51 app. F,
Breard, 523 U.S. 371 (No. 97-8214).
30. Id.
31. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 538.
32. Again, the U.S. courts refused to act. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526
U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (denying a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint and Germany's
motion for preliminary injunction seeking to give effect to the ICJ provisional measures
order).
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Virginia counterpart, the Governor of Arizona decided to proceed with the
execution.
33
Both the Virginia and Arizona cases provide unusually powerful examples
of the system of gubernatorial foreign policy in action. The ICJ's provisional
measures orders represented both a legal obligation and a foreign policy
challenge. When U.S. courts refused to enforce the orders, responding to the
ICJ's orders became a question of foreign policy. This foreign policy question
did not involve only U.S. relations with countries like Paraguay and Germany,
but also U.S. relations with the ICJ itself, which serves as the primary judicial
arm of the United Nations system. Each member of the United Nations, for
instance, has an obligation to carry out ICJ judgments in cases to which it is a
party.34 Yet despite these various foreign policy implications, the ultimate
decision of how to respond to the ICJ orders was left to the Governors of
Virginia and Arizona without any direct intervention by the federal
government.
The central role of state governors is confirmed by the complicated U.S.
response to the most recent ICJ Vienna Convention decision in Avena. 31 In that
case, brought by Mexico, the ICJ ordered the provision of judicial remedies to
fifty-one Mexican nationals facing death sentences in the United States. 6
Although the federal government has intervened in the cases of these
individuals, even that federal intervention was calculated to allow state
executives to make the initial foreign policy decision.
The very first case testing the effect of the ICJ's judgment in Avena
occurred in Oklahoma. As discussed earlier, even though the Oklahoma court
eventually decided to give effect to the ICJ's order, Governor Henry had
already decided to respond to the twin pressures of Mexico and the ICJ by
granting clemency to Torres, the condemned Mexican national.3 7 Facing
almost identical facts, however, the Governor of Texas announced that he
would not accede to the ICJ's judgment ordering him to stop the execution of
33. Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany 9 4.169-4.171, LaGrand Case (F.RIG. v.
U.S.) (Sept. 16, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/
igusframe.htm (follow "Written Pleadings" hyperlink). When Germany persisted with the
case after the execution, Arizona went so far as to dispatch its Attorney General (later
Governor) to The Hague to defend Arizona's actions before the ICJ. Verbatim Record
2.1-2.58, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Nov. 14, 2000) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (follow "Oral Pleadings" hyperlink).
34. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 1 ("Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.").
35. Avena Judgment, supra note 1.
36. Id. 138-141.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.




another Mexican national, Jose Medellin. 8 Texas's refusal to act prompted
federal intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to
consider the legal effect of the ICJ's judgment.39 The federal government
intervened once again when President Bush issued a memorandum purporting
to require Texas state courts to comply with the ICJ's judgment with respect to
Mexican nationals facing execution in Texas.4°
This might suggest an end to the use of gubernatorial foreign policy to
respond to ICJ judgments. However, the careful phrasing of the memorandum
reveals that the federal government remains reluctant to compel state
compliance with federal foreign policy goals. 41 The President's memorandum is
directed not at the Governor of Texas but at the state courts. Moreover, it
directs those courts to apply principles of "comity" in order to implement the
ICJ's judgment rather than simply requiring compliance with the ICJ's
judgment as a matter of legal obligation. Indeed, the legal effect of even the
President's memorandum is being challenged in Texas courts. 42 All of this
carefully circumscribed language suggests that the federal government will
continue to leave room for a gubernatorial foreign policy in future cases
involving international tribunal judgments.
2. International Agreements
The role of governors in responding to demands by foreign governments
and international institutions is probably the most dramatic example of a
gubernatorial foreign policy. But governors can also take a more direct and
38. See Texas To Ignore Court Order To Stay Executions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A33
[hereinafter Texas To Ignore Court Order] (quoting the Texas Governor's spokesman as
saying that "there is no authority for the federal government or this World Court to prohibit
Texas from exercising the laws passed by our legislature").
39. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 663 (quoting in full the Memorandum from George W. Bush to the Attorney General
(Feb. 28, 2005)).
41. See id. ("I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will
discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of
Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals ... by having State courts
give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.").
42. See Ex parte Medellin, No. AP-752o7, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. June 22, 2005).
The legal effect of the President's memorandum was raised during the briefing of the case.
Brief of the States of Alabama, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Ex parte Medellin, No. AP-752o7, 2005 WL 3142646.
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assertive role in foreign policy by negotiating and entering into international
agreements.43 Although these agreements generally are made only with foreign
regional governments, they are far from trivial. These agreements seek to
regulate a variety of international matters such as fuel tax allocation, cross-
border motor vehicle regulation, natural resources management, and even
greenhouse gas emissions. Governors negotiate and sign such agreements
either pursuant to their independent state constitutional authority or pursuant
to a specific statutory authorization.
a. Bilateral Agreements
The most common and unremarkable form of state international
agreement is a bicultural exchange agreement with a foreign government.44 As
a report released by the National Governors Association observed, states use
bilateral cultural exchange agreements to bolster their economic relationships
with certain foreign countries. To take just one example, at least twenty-five
states have signed bilateral trade, cultural, and educational agreements with
Israel.4" Such agreements are generally made during a governor's visit to a
particular foreign country. For instance, Governor Gray Davis of California
signed an agreement for cooperation in the development of biotechnology
during his 1999 visit to Israel., 6 Many of these agreements are phrased in non-
binding terms, but as a National Governors Association study of these
agreements suggests, they are increasingly common and important
43. See Raymond Spencer Rodgers, Notes and Comments, The Capacity of States of the Union To
Conclude International Agreements: The Background and Some Recent Developments, 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1021, lO24-28 (1967) (describing several agreements between states and Canada).
44. A general review of these activities, including "sister-city" agreements, is discussed in
Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821
(1989).
45. See NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, How STATES ARE USING ARTS AND
CULTURE To STRENGTHEN THEIR GLOBAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT 12 (2003), available at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/o4olo3GLOBALTRADEDEV.pdf [hereinafter NGA STUDY].
The states include Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Vermont.
46. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Israel Biotechnology Organization
and the California Commission on Bioscience, Oct. 29, 1999,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/cabio.html (establishing a "formal
relationship between the Israel Biotechnology Organization and the California Governor's
Commission on Bioscience in order to foster technology, business development and
educational opportunities, through business interaction in the public and private sectors").
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mechanisms for governors seeking to attract trade, investment, and tourism to
their states.
47
More significantly, governors of northern border states have sought deep
levels of cooperation with Canadian provincial governments. A number of
states, for instance, have entered into bilateral reciprocal agreements with the
Province of Quebec for the treatment of traffic sanctions, the inspection of
commercial vehicles, and buses. 4' Traffic agreements require each state or
province to recognize traffic offenses committed by their residents in the other
party's jurisdiction for purposes of driver's license suspensions.49 Reciprocal
inspection agreements allow one party's inspection to satisfy inspection
requirements in the other party's jurisdiction."0 States have also made similar
reciprocal agreements in the area of child-support regulation."'
Though these reciprocal agreements seem trivial, they represent a
potentially important gubernatorial power. These agreements appear to be
negotiated exclusively by state governors and their subordinates, with little
legislative involvement and no federal supervision; they are typically
recognized by statute or incorporated by administrative action. While some
state legislatures have specifically granted their executives the authority to
47. See NGA STUDY, supra note 45, at 1.
48. Regulation Respecting a Reciprocal Agreement Between the Gouvernement du Qu6bec and
the Government of the State of Maine Concerning Drivers' Licenses and Traffic Offenses,
R.Q. c. C-24.2, r.o.1.2.2 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/qc/1aws/reguI
c24 .2r.o.1.2.2/2oo6o31o/whole.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2006); Regulation Respecting the
Reciprocal Agreement Between the State of New York and Qu6bec Concerning Drivers'
Licenses and Traffic Offenses, R.Q. c. C-24.2, r.o.1.2 (Can.), available at
http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/regu/c-24.2r.o.1.2/2oo5o8og/whole.html (last visited Aug. 7,
2006); Regulation Respecting Reciprocal Commercial Vehicle Registration Agreements
Between the Gouvernement du Qu.bec and Certain American States, R.Q. c. C-24.2, r.o.1.5
(Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/qc/laws/regu/c-24.2r.o.i.5/2oolo19/whole.html
(listing agreements between Quebec and forty-one different states) (last visited Aug. 7,
2006); Regulation Respecting an Agreement Between the Gouvernement du Qubec and
the Government of the State of New York Respecting the Mechanical Inspection of Buses,
R.Q c. C-24.2, r.o.1.2.1 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.orgqciaws/regu/c-
24 .2r.o.1.2.1/200 5 1o9/whole.htrml (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
49. See, e.g., Regulation Respecting the Reciprocal Agreement Between the State of New York
and Qu6bec Concerning Drivers' Licenses and Traffic Offenses, supra note 48, art. 3.3.
so. See, e.g., Regulation Respecting an Agreement Between the Gouvernement du Quebec and
the Government of the State of New York Respecting the Mechanical Inspection of Buses,
supra note 48, art. 2.
51. See, e.g., Gloria Folger Dehart, Comity, Conventions, and the Constitution: State and Federal
Initiatives in International Support Enforcement, 28 FAM. L.Q.89 (1994).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 2393
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
enter into such agreements, 2 other state executives appear to be acting under
their own constitutional authority. In any case, these agreements have become




Governors also take the lead in the negotiation and implementation of
broad multilateral agreements involving several states and foreign provinces.
Perhaps the most successful example of a state multilateral agreement is the
Great Lakes Charter, an agreement among seven U.S. states and two Canadian
provinces to cooperatively manage the waters of the Great Lakes. 4
The original charter, signed in 1985, committed the parties to develop
mechanisms for cooperating in the management of the Great Lakes resources."5
A subsequent 2001 agreement committed the parties to prepare "a Basin-wide
binding agreement(s), such as an interstate compact and such other
agreements, protocols or other arrangements between the States and
Provinces." 6 The states and provinces finalized this commitment in December
2005 when they agreed to a prohibition on new or increased diversions of water
from the Great Lakes, subject to certain limitations.5 7
P. For an example of a state statute authorizing such agreements, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-
3-1309(2) (2005), which states, "The public service commission may enter into reciprocal
agreements with adjacent states and bordering Canadian provinces that Montana's
inspectors may inspect trains while they are stopped in those states or provinces before they
cross the Montana border." For another example, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 46.23.020
(West 2001), which authorizes the Washington Department of Licensing to execute a
reciprocal agreement with the Canadian Province of British Columbia.
53. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Governor's Office, Governor and Qugbec Premier Hold
Third Economic Summit (Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://www.state.ny.us/governor/
press/o5/oct5_o5.htm.
s4. Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management
of Great Lakes Water Resources, Feb. 11, 1985, available at http://www.glc.org/wateruse/
wrmdss/finalreport/pdf/GreatLakesCharter.pdf (establishing an agreement among the
states and provinces bordering the Great Lakes).
ss. Id.
s6. Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary
Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter, June 18, 2oOl, at 2, available at
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharterAnnex.pdf.
57. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable
Water Resources Agreement art. 200, Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.cglg.org/
projects/water/docs/12-13-o5/GreatLakes-St LawrenceRiverBasin_SustainableWater
_ResourcesAgreement.pdf; see also Council of Great Lakes Governors, Frequently Asked
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This latest agreement is also accompanied by a "Compact" that includes all
the parties to the 2001 Annex Agreements except for the Canadian provinces. s8
While the precise definition of a "compact" remains uncertain, 9 compacts may
include agreements between different U.S. states as well as agreements
between U.S. states and foreign states (although some agreements with foreign
governments may not rise to the level of a compact). Both kinds of compacts
require congressional approval. 6°
Even compacts requiring congressional approval, however, represent a
form of gubernatorial foreign policy. Agreements such as the Great Lakes
Charter were negotiated by governors directly with other governors and with
foreign provincial leaders. The federal executive played no official role in the
negotiations.6i It did not, for instance, sign any of the agreements. Congress's
role is only to approve or disapprove the compact negotiated by the governors.
This last example illustrates how state executives can shape foreign policy
in cooperation with the federal government. State governors in this case play
the role otherwise held by the federal executive in the negotiation of a typical
international agreement. Indeed, because the distinction between a compact
requiring congressional approval and an agreement that can be made by the
states alone is hardly self-evident, state governors may have the authority to
make agreements with foreign governments that are never reviewed by the
federal government. At least one state court has recognized that some
agreements with foreign governments do not rise to the level of a compact
Questions: Annex 2001 Implementing Agreements (Jan. 2006), http://www.cglg.org/
projects/water/docs/12-13-o5/Annex ImplementingAgreements Frequently-Asked
Questions 1-23-o6.pdf.
58. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes - St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
Compact, Dec. 13, 2005, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-
o5/GreatLakes-StLawrenceRiverBasin water resources compact.pdf.
59. See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403,
499-510 (2003) (arguing that the judicial definition of "foreign compact" remains flexible).
But see McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540 (N.D. 1917).
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power .... ).
61. The absence of the federal executive is surprising considering that both the Supreme Court
and the executive take the view that states cannot negotiate with any foreign governments.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 574 (1840) (Taney, C.J.) (describing the
Framers' intention that "there would be no occasion for negotiation or intercourse between
the state authorities and a foreign government"); 5 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (1943) (quoting a State Department letter rejecting proposed
Florida-Cuba compact negotiations); see also Swaine, supra note 59, at 506 n.402 (describing
a State Department letter warning that "individual states have no authority to negotiate or
conclude international agreements").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2395
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
requiring federal approval, 6' and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
preliminary negotiations to an interstate compact are not always prohibited.6 3
Governors have also negotiated and entered into international agreements
that may actually differ from the .foreign policies pursued by the federal
government. A number of U.S. governors, for instance, have joined with a
number of Canadian provinces to set greenhouse gas reduction goals. 64 This
agreement committed parties, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 199o
levels by 201o, and to ten percent below 199o levels by 2020.65 These goals
were similar to the reduction goals set in the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change.66 Of course, the United
States famously has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and to commit itself to
the Protocol's aggressive targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. 67
These and other state international agreements represent a softer, less
dramatic example of gubernatorial foreign policy. Governors negotiate, sign,
and implement agreements with foreign governments or at least subnational
entities of foreign governments. All of these agreements implicate overall U.S.
foreign relations by establishing cross-border cooperation, by building U.S.
ties to countries such as Israel, or by adopting a position on the necessity of
international cooperation to secure a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
All of these agreements place governors at the center of a foreign policy
process, from which the federal government may often be excluded.
62. See Brady, 163 N.W. 54o (upholding an agreement between North Dakota and a Canadian
town as not violating the Compact Clause).
63. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893) (holding that boundary negotiations between
Virginia and Tennessee did not violate the Compact Clause).
64. See Conference of New England Governors & E. Canadian Premiers, Climate Change Action
Plan, Aug. 28, 2oo, http://www.scics.gc.ca/pdf/85oo84o11_e.pdf [hereinafter Climate
Change Action Plan]; see also Ken Colburn & Amy Royden, New England States and Eastern
Canadian Provinces Team Up To Tackle Climate Change, CLIMATE CHANGE & SUSTAINABLE
DEv. NEWSL., June 2003, at 7.
65. Climate Change Action Plan, supra note 64, at 7.
66. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. lo,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
convkp/kpeng.pdf (requiring member states to reduce emissions to five percent below 199o
levels by 20o8-2o12).
67. See Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Charles Hagel, Jesse Helms, Larry
Craig, & Pat Roberts (Mar. 13, 2001) (explaining his opposition and the Senate's opposition
to joining the Kyoto Protocol), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2ool/o3/2001o314.html.




3. Executive Actions Pursuant to Statutory Authorization
The final example of gubernatorial foreign policy illustrates how governors
act in cooperation with their state legislatures. It also illustrates how non-
gubernatorial executive officials may be authorized to take actions that
implicate foreign policy.
State legislatures have enacted a number of statutes that directly impact
foreign affairs. The most controversial statutes require businesses that apply
for state contracts to certify that they avoid business transactions with certain
foreign countries.68  Less aggressively, some statutes require businesses
applying for state contracts to certify that their business in certain foreign
countries complies with non-discriminatory principles.6 9 State governments
have also prohibited state executive officials from investing state pension funds
in certain foreign countries.
In a different vein, a number of states have enacted statutes imposing
special disclosure requirements on foreign insurance companies as part of state
regulation of the insurance industry. 7 These and other statutes can be fairly
classified within my definition of gubernatorial foreign policy for two reasons.
First, the Supreme Court has generally relied on the existence of an express
federal statute or policy to invalidate such statutes. It has thus far avoided
presumptions based on dormant federal control over foreign policy. Second,
although governors and other executive officials act pursuant to state statutes,
these statutes often grant governors or state executive officials significant
discretion.
For instance, the well-known state efforts to regulate or suspend the
licenses of insurance companies that issued, but did not honor, policies to
Holocaust victims leave substantial discretion to state executive officials.
Washington State allows its insurance regulators to lift such a suspension if the
regulating company "is participating in the international commission process
in good faith and is working through the international commission to resolve
68. See, e.g., An Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in
Burma (Myanmar), ch. 130, 1996 Mass. Acts 239 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7,
§§ 22G-M (West 2002)), invalidated by Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363
(2ooo).
69. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22C (West 2002) (requiring businesses operating in
Northern Ireland to certify non-discriminatory practices).
70. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-13h (West 2005) (restricting the use of state
investment funds in Northern Ireland).
71. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE SS 138oo-13807 (West 2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.5 (West
Cum. Supp. 2003).
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all outstanding claims with offers of fair settlements in a reasonable time
frame."72
In sum, state interventions in foreign policy through legislative enactments
typically allocate substantial discretion to state executive officials. Such officials
exercise foreign policy powers by waiving statutory requirements or even
terminating such requirements based upon their discretionary judgment.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF A GUBERNATORIAL FOREIGN POLICY
The system of gubernatorial foreign policy I have described appears at odds
with the usual conception of federal government domination over foreign
affairs. In this Part, I examine the legal basis for the system of gubernatorial
foreign policy. I conclude that even the most extreme form of gubernatorial
foreign policy-in which a governor acts in conflict with the policy of the
federal government- is consistent with existing understandings of the balance
between federal and state powers under the Constitution.
The federal government's political branches have accepted and even
buttressed these constitutional understandings by clearing out a constitutional
space for a gubernatorial foreign policy. In a number of circumstances, the
federal government has even declared that it will rely on state governments to
carry out many of its international obligations. Without the power to
commandeer the states, however, this means that the implementation of these
international obligations is within the discretion of state governors.
A. A Constitutional Space for a Gubernatorial Foreign Policy
The constitutional framework supporting the operation of a gubernatorial
foreign policy has two doctrinal components. First, while the Supreme Court
has found that the federal government preempted a number of state activities
in recent years, it has refrained from endorsing a theory of federal exclusivity
over foreign affairs. This means that governors are generally free to engage in
foreign policy activities absent express preemption by Congress or the
President.73 Second, the Court has continued to impose constitutional
72. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 48.104.090 (West 2005).
73. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003) (invalidating a California
statute on the basis that it impermissibly interfered with the federal government's conduct
of foreign relations, because it required insurance companies doing business in California to
disclose all information relating to policies sold in Europe by the company or anyone
"related" to it between 192o and 1945); Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372-73 (holding that a federal
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prohibitions on the commandeering of state governors and other state
executive officials, thus limiting the ability of the federal government to
commandeer governors to fulfill a particular foreign affairs goal.
1. The Retreat from Federal Exclusivity
The theory of federal exclusivity holds that state governments cannot
encroach on matters implicating foreign affairs, whether or not the federal
government has actually approved a treaty, statute, executive agreement, or
declaration with respect to the particular foreign policy issue. 74 This view
enjoys broad support among commentators,7" and a number of the Court's
decisions have also embraced this approach.76 For instance, on one occasion,
the Supreme Court went so far as to declare that, for the purposes of foreign
affairs, the "state[s] .... do[] not exist.
77
The most powerful judicial articulation of the theory of federal exclusivity
is found in Zschernig v. Miller. 8 In Zschernig, the Supreme Court invalidated
an Oregon statute limiting the rights of foreigners to inherit real property if the
inheriting foreign national's home country did not give U.S. citizens similar
rights.79 The Court's decision depended on a theory of exclusivity because the
Court did not find that the state statute had been expressly preempted by any
treaty, statute, or presidential order. Instead, the Court held that state laws
"must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign
policy. "8°
statute preempted a Massachusetts statute barring state entities from buying goods or
services from companies that did business with the nation of Burma).
74. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 163-65 (2d ed. 1996)
(describing the view that states are excluded from foreign affairs even without action by
federal political branches).
75. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1245, 1297 (1996) ("[T]he Constitution appears to preclude the states from exercising
direct authority over foreign relations ...."); Denning & McCall, supra note 12 (arguing
that state foreign policy activities are unconstitutional); David Schmahmann & James Finch,
The Unconstitutionality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business
7ies with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997) (arguing that state and
local sanctions against Burma may be unconstitutional).
76. For a summary of the Supreme Court case law in this vein, see Ramsey, supra note 12, at
350-65.
77. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S 324, 331 (1937).
78. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
79. Id. at 440.
8o. Id.
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Since the Zschernig decision, the Court has not reaffirmed the federal
exclusivity approach despite having had several opportunities to do so.8' The
Court's most recent decision in American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi
reflects this reluctance. The lower court in that case had invoked Zschernig to
invalidate a California statute targeting foreign insurance companies for failing
to pay World War II-related policies, on the ground that the statute interfered
with the federal foreign affairs power;2 the Supreme Court, however, took a
different approach. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Souter relied on
executive agreements between the United States and German governments as
evidence that the federal government had preempted California's statute.
Although these agreements did not explicidy preempt California law, the Court
found them to be evidence of an "unmistakabl[e]" policy to negotiate a
resolution to the insurance coverage dispute. s
The Court's opinion thus avoided adopting Zschernig's exclusivity view, at
least in its broadest formulation. Instead, the Court suggested that its approach
followed Justice Harlan's concurrence in Zschernig, which would require
preemption of state law if "state legislation will produce something more than
incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the National
Government. ''8 ' The test, Justice Souter held, depended on weighing the
"strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when
deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law
preempted. ''8 ' He also suggested that the strength of the state interest in a
particular policy could reduce the likelihood that the Court would find that
policy to be in conflict with federal law.8 6
s. Most notably, the Court avoided invoking a broad Zschernig-style approach to preemption
in Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994), when it upheld a
state tax that appeared to conflict with a broader federal international tax policy.
82. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397 (2003) (describing the district court's
preliminary injunction holding that the California statute is an unconstitutional violation of
federal foreign affairs power).
83. Id. at 421.
84. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Id. Although Justice Souter had no difficulty finding that there had been a necessary conflict
between the state and federal laws in Zschernig, he did suggest that at some point the
strength of the state interest in vindicating the claims of Holocaust survivors might displace
the federal standard. But because the federal government has the same interest, he held, the
"humanity underlying the state statute could not give the State the benefit of any doubt in
resolving the conflict with national policy." Id. at 426-27.
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Garamendi has been criticized for giving the federal executive branch too
much discretion in its power to preempt state law.8 7 Even so, Garamendi's
approach still leaves room for a system of gubernatorial foreign policy. If the
Court had revived Zschernig's approach, almost all of the activities I described
in Part I would be subject to immediate preemption by federal courts whether
or not the federal executive or legislative branches had acted. But the Supreme
Court's reluctance to reaffirm Zschernig's theory of broad federal exclusivity
suggests that there is doctrinal room for a gubernatorial foreign policy absent a
clearly conflicting treaty, statute, executive agreement, or presidential
declaration. Even in such a case, the Court would, per Justice Souter, weigh the
strength of the state's interest against the federal claim of preemption.
2. Commandeering
While a system of gubernatorial foreign policy can survive under the
Supreme Court's approach in Garamendi, the Court still recognizes the federal
government's power to preempt (through treaty, statute, or executive act)
almost all forms of state activities affecting foreign affairs. This express
preemptive power was broadly endorsed by both the Crosby and Garamendi
decisions and could effectively wipe out almost all forms of gubernatorial
foreign policy. But the federal government's preemptive power is not
unconstrained. Rather, it is limited by the constitutional prohibitions on the
commandeering of states and state executive officials.
a. New York v. United States and Printz v. United States
In addition to its decisions limiting the federal government's exercise of
power pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 8 the Supreme Court has imposed
limitations on the federal government's ability to "commandeer" state
governments to carry out federal policies.8 ' The Court derived these "anti-
commandeering" principles from the Tenth Amendment's recognition of the
states' residual sovereignty. 90
87. See id. at 430 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey,
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46
WM. &MARY L. REV. 825, 898-925 (2004).
88. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
89. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992).
go. Printz, 521 U.S. at 919.
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The modern Court's application of the anti-commandeering doctrine began
with New York v. United States,9' which invalidated a federal regulatory
scheme requiring states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste. The federal
law was invalidated for impermissibly intruding on state sovereignty by
commandeering the state governments to "enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program." '92 Five years later, the Court extended these anti-
commandeering protections to state executive officials. In Printz v. United
States,93 the federal government argued that the gun background check
program was distinguishable from New York because the program merely
required state executive officials to provide "non-policymaking help in
enforcing that law."94 But Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court held that such a
distinction was immaterial. "Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition [on
commandeering] by conscripting the States' officers directly."' s
Unlike the Court's other federalism decisions, New York and Printz do not
place constitutional limitations on the subject matter of federal regulations.
Rather, the decisions limit how the federal government may pursue its
regulatory objectives. Thus, even if the federal government has an
unquestioned constitutional authority to regulate, the anti-commandeering
decisions nevertheless prevent the federal government from requiring state
executive officials to carry out its regulatory plan.
According to the Court, the prohibition on anti-commandeering reflects
the Constitution's commitment to a dual system of sovereignties, including
both the federal and state governments. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court in New York stated this principle broadly:
States are not mere political subdivisions of the United States. State
governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the
Federal Government. The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere
on the Federal Government's most detailed organizational chart. The
Constitution instead "leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable
sovereignty," reserved explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 6
91. 505 U.S. 144.
92. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981)).
93. 521 U.S. 898.
94. Id. at 927.
95. Id. at 935.
96. New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (citation omitted).
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b. Commandeering and Foreign Affairs
Neither New York nor Printz discussed whether the constitutional
prohibition on commandeering also applies to the federal government's power
to conduct foreign affairs. Nor has the Court addressed this question in later
decisions discussing or applying the anti-commandeering doctrine.9" Scholars,
however, have highlighted the potential significance of the anti-
commandeering principle, particularly as it was applied in Printz, to the federal
government's efforts to exercise its foreign affairs powers against the states
through the treaty power.
Professor Vizquez, for instance, argued that the primary legal justification
for the anti-commandeering principle- namely, the Tenth Amendment's
recognition of state sovereignty- does not apply to exercises of the federal
treaty power.98 He cited Justice Holmes's famous holding in Missouri v.
Holland99 that the treaty power is not limited by any "invisible radiation" of
the Tenth Amendment.' Unlike the federal government's exercise of domestic
constitutional powers, the federal treaty power does not infringe on any aspect
of state sovereignty recognized by the Tenth Amendment because there are no
limitations on the subjects that can be regulated by treaties."'
While compelling, this critique of anti-commandeering in the foreign
affairs context fails to grapple with the important distinction between the
power to make a treaty and the power to implement a treaty's obligations. The
Constitution plainly allocates to the federal government the exclusive power to
make treaties by negotiating, signing, ratifying, and acceding to treaties with
foreign governments. °2 This power to make treaties is not reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment. But it does not follow that the Constitution
97. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000). In fact, no court has addressed the foreign
affairs implications of Printz and New York. The First Circuit briefly considered the issue,
but found that the litigant had waived the argument. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 60 n.17 (ist Cir. 1999).
98. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1317,
1354 (1999).
99. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
lOO. Id. at 434.
ioi. Vizquez therefore argued that the Printz limitation should be read very narrowly. Vizquez,
supra note 98, at 135o-58. Professor Flaherty added a review of historical materials that
generally agreed with this analysis. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be a Nation? Federal
Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 7 0 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1296 (199).
1o2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1o, cl. 1 (denying states the power to make treaties); id. art II, § 2,
cl. 2 (granting to the President the power to make treaties).
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also allocates to the federal government the exclusive power to implement a
treaty's obligations as a matter of domestic law. 13
Within the U.S. system, treaties hold the status of supreme federal law'
4
and it is generally accepted that treaties are equivalent to federal statutes.' s But
it is also generally accepted that many treaties are "non-self-executing" in the
sense that they do not have domestic legal effect unless and until they are
separately implemented. o 6 And even some "self-executing" treaties cannot be
enforced by courts because they do not create private causes of action.
1 7
A common mechanism for implementing a treaty's obligations, as Chief
Justice Marshall noted, is a new federal statute specifically designed to
implement the treaty. ' 8 But this is not the only mechanism. Some treaties may
be implemented by presidential action, ' °9 while others may be implemented by
state governments. 0  The variety of domestic legal mechanisms for
implementing treaties suggests that the constitutional power to implement a
treaty is not necessarily coterminous with the constitutional power to make a
treaty. The fact that the President or Congress has some power to implement
treaties, for instance, does not mean that either institution's implementing
actions are free of constitutional constraints imposed by either federalism or
103. The treaty power is only one of the foreign affairs powers that might be invoked against the
states. A similar distinction might limit the federal government's power to invoke customary
international law against the states. While Congress and the President hold the power to
recognize rules of customary international law as binding on the U.S. government, their
power to implement these rules against the states is still constrained by the Constitution's
anti-commandeering prohibitions. For a discussion of other limitations on the effect of
customary international law on the states, see Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in
Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 Sup. CT. REV. 153, 217-19.
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... ").
1o5. See Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal
Statutes, 8o IND. L.J. 319, 339-45 (2005) (describing general judicial acceptance of, but noting
scholarly disagreements about, the doctrine equating treaties with federal statutes).
1o6. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.) (declaring treaties
the law of the land but noting that in some cases, the "legislature must execute the [treaty],
before it can become a rule for the Court").
107. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
695, 722-23 (1995) (describing different types of non-self-execution, including the lack of a
private right of action).
1o8. See Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
iog. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. io, 1998) (implementing U.S.
obligations under various international human rights treaties).
11o. See Ku, supra note 9, at 499-510 (describing state implementation of treaties involving
private international law).
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separation of powers. Indeed, as Professor Rosenkranz has forcefully argued,
Congress may not be able to rely upon its delegated authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause when implementing a treaty by legislation. 1
Rather, Congress may need to rely upon its other delegated powers to enact
legislation implementing a treaty.
For this reason, when the federal government implements (as opposed to
makes) a treaty, it is almost certainly limited by the same Tenth Amendment
principles that limit its activities in the domestic sphere. Many of the same
concerns animating the anti-commandeering prohibition in the domestic
context can be invoked in the treaty-implementation context as well. For
instance, in the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, the federal government obligated itself to notify consulates
whenever a foreign national was arrested in the United States.'12 As in Printz,
state officials are absorbing all of the costs of and responsibility for
implementing this federal obligation. Without having any input in the
development of the policy, states are "put in the position of taking the blame
for [a federal obligation's] burdensomeness and for its defects."" 3
This burden on the states is not an unavoidable consequence of federal
control over the treaty power because there are other non-commandeering
methods for the federal government to fulfill its treaty obligations. It could
implement its obligations by, for instance, creating a private right of action in
federal courts for foreign nationals to challenge violations of their consular
rights. 114 It could even pass legislation imposing conditions on federal spending
that would require state and local officials to comply with treaty obligations."'
These alternative methods could thus accomplish the federal (and
international) regulatory objective without commandeering state and local
officials.
iii. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HALv. L. REv. 1868, i88o-
1912 (2005) (arguing that Congress's legislative power under Article I to implement treaties
is limited to matters it otherwise would have domestic authority to regulate).
liz. See Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 17.
113. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
114. For instance, the Court has stated that a treaty can serve as the basis for a private lawsuit
invalidating a state law. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1924).
115. As far as I know, this method has never been tried in the context of treaty implementation.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court is likely to uphold any conditional spending
legislation against Tenth Amendment challenges. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
210-11 (1987) (rejecting an "independent constitutional bar" to the use of the spending
power to compel state action).
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B. Expanding the Constitutional Space
Even assuming that the federal foreign affairs power is not exclusive and
that the federal government lacks the power to commandeer state officials, the
federal government continues to avail itself of a number of mechanisms to
compel adherence to national foreign policies. Surprisingly, the federal
government has emphatically chosen not to wield its most expansive and
unchallenged power: preemption by treaty or statute. The choice to avoid
preemption by limiting the domestic effect of a treaty, combined with the
judicial prohibition on commandeering, carves out further space for state
governors to exercise independent discretion in certain matters affecting
foreign affairs.
1. Responding to Foreign Demands
States often become involved in foreign policy when a foreign government
requests or demands that the United States alter some aspect of its domestic
regulation or practice.116 The federal government has adopted a number of
strategies to respond to the often justifiable protests from foreign
governments." 7 There is one strategy, however, that the federal government
appears never to have adopted in response to foreign government demands. It
has never ordered or "commandeered" state officials to comply with the
demands of a foreign government or to carry out U.S. international law
obligations."' Instead, it has permitted the state governments to make the
ultimate decision over how and even whether to comply with foreign demands.
Indeed, the federal government has consistently relied on the state
governments to carry out its international obligations to international
tribunals." 9 When defending its actions before the ICJ, the federal government
emphasized the sovereign status of the states: "The separate states are not
subsidiary bodies subordinate to the power of the Federal Government and
subject to its direction. Rather, they remain sovereign and are the masters of
116. See Ku, supra note 9, at 495-99-
117. Id.
iis. See id.
mg. See discussion supra Subsection I.B.1.




their affairs within the areas of responsibility reserved to them by the United
States Constitution. '" 20
This record of historical and modern practice does more than simply
support the proposition that the "commandeering" prohibition applies to state
officials in foreign policy contexts. Even if the federal government has such a
commandeering power, it has emphatically chosen not to exercise it. Thus,
even if it is not constitutionally constrained from interfering with the states,
the federal government has often left the decision of how to respond to foreign
governments' demands to the independent judgment of state officials.
2. Treaty Limitations
Though the federal government has refrained from attempting to
commandeer or otherwise interfere with state governors in response to
demands from foreign governments, it does have the acknowledged power to
preempt state activities through treaty, statute, executive agreement, or
executive declaration.' 2' Assuming that Missouri v. Holland remains good
law,'22 the federal government still has broad powers to eliminate state
activities that interfere in foreign affairs. Surprisingly, the federal government
has chosen not to exercise this power against the states. To the contrary, it has
imposed severe limitations on its own ability to preempt state activity through
treaties. These limitations carve out even more space for discretionary
gubernatorial actions affecting foreign policy.
The most dramatic examples of the federal government's self-imposed
limitations are found in reservations, understandings, and declarations
12o. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America 121, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.)
(Mar. 27, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm
(follow "Written Pleadings" hyperlink).
121. The first three methods have long been recognized. See HENKIN, supra note 74, at 157-58
(explaining that "there is no reason why a treaty, an executive agreement, a judicial doctrine
or any federal regulation" should not preempt state law). The fourth method was
recognized by the Supreme Court in American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396,
401 (2003).
12a. This may be a large assumption considering the strength of two recent academic attacks on
the decision. See Bradley, supra note 9, at 553 (calling for the partial overruling of Missouri v.
Holland's claim that no federalism limitations exist on the scope of the treaty power);
Rosenkranz, supra note ill (calling for the overruling of Missouri v. Holland's holding that
legislation implementing treaties is not subject to Tenth Amendment federalism
limitations).
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attached to the ratification of international agreements.' 23 These "RUDs" are
usually conditions imposed by the Senate before giving advice and consent to
treaties. In the trade context, the limitations are contained in legislation
approving and implementing trade agreements. Although these limitations
take different forms, all have the same legal consequence: They prevent
international agreements from preempting, commandeering, or otherwise
restricting the ability of state officials to act in matters affecting foreign affairs.
For instance, a number of state laws and activities have been challenged as
violations of U.S. obligations under international trade agreements.'24 But
states are largely free to ignore such findings, which do not have any direct
effect in the U.S. domestic system. In approving the agreements, Congress
specifically prevented such agreements from having any preemptive effect
except in a lawsuit brought by the U.S. government itself.2 '
Even though the federal government has never brought a lawsuit to enforce
trade agreements against the states, the trade agreements do preserve the
federal government's authority to preempt inconsistent state law by lawsuit.
No such provision is found in the conditions attached to U.S. ratification of
leading international human rights treaties, however. For instance, in ratifying
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, the United States
attached a federalism "understanding[]" stating that the treaty would be
implemented by the federal government within its existing jurisdiction, "and
otherwise by the state and local governments .... ,,26
The understanding reflects the President's and Senate's belief that the
treaty does not alter the existing division of authority between the federal and
state governments. The explicit recognition that the states would be
responsible for implementing the treaty with respect to those matters within
their existing jurisdiction further indicates that the treaty does not provide the
123. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (2000) (providing a general overview of the system of
reservations, understandings, and declarations).
124. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) (reviewing the compatibility
of certain state gambling regulations and trade treaty obligations); Final Award of the
Tribunal, Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (Aug. 3, 2005) (considering and
then rejecting the argument that a California gasoline regulation violated NAFTA
obligations), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51o52.pdf.
Although the United States essentially prevailed in both cases, the cases do illustrate the
exposure of state law to international trade obligations.
125. See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2000); id. § 3512(b)(2)(A).
126. S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 23, 24 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 659.




constitutional authority for federal legislation preempting matters currently
controlled by the states.
This suggestion has been strengthened in the most recent treaties approved
by the U.S. Senate. Upon ratifying the recent Convention against
Transnational Crime 1 7 in the fall of 2005, the U.S. Senate attached a
reservation declaring that the U.S. government is not bound by the treaty to
the extent it required the federal government to "address conduct which would
fall within" a sphere of local activity governed exclusively by state law.2' In
essence, the reservation removes any implication that the treaty could authorize
federal preemptive authority over state activities, even if those activities
affected the subject matter of the treaty. Similar reservations have been
proposed for at least two other treaties under consideration by the Senate.'29
By imposing federalism limitations upon the domestic effect of these
international agreements, the federal government has deliberately deprived
itself of a key tool to compel state compliance with its foreign policies. Treaties,
executive agreements, and implementing statutes are the primary mechanisms
by which the federal government preempts inconsistent state law. Accepting
the imposition of the above federalism limitations, however, means that such
treaties, international agreements, and statutes cannot be used to compel state
adherence to national foreign policy goals.
Because the federal government has effectively handcuffed itself from
preempting state activity in many areas involving foreign policy, the state
governments are the only governmental institutions in the United States
authorized to fulfill those U.S. treaty obligations. As I have suggested, this
often means that governors will be left with the sole power to decide whether
and how to respond to foreign demands under the treaties.
127. S. TREATY Doc. No. 1o8-16 (2005).
128. Id. § 2(a)(1).
129. See, e.g., LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, S.
TREATY Doc. No. lO9-6 (2005), available at 2003 WL 24205811 ("The Government of the
United States of America reserves the right to assume obligations under this Convention in
a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of federalism . . . [and] therefore
reserves to the obligations set forth in the Convention to the extent they (i) address conduct
that would fall within this narrow category of highly localized activity or (2) involve
preventive measures not covered by federal law governing state and local officials.");
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME, S. TREATY Doc. No. 1o8-ii (2001),
available at 2001 W-L 34368783 ("The Government of The United States of America,
pursuant to Articles 41 and 42, reserves the right to assume obligations under Chapter II of
the Convention in a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of federalism.").
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III. THE ADVANTAGES OF GUBERNATORIAL FOREIGN POLICY
The emergence of a system of gubernatorial foreign policy will be
controversial. In the broader debate over foreign affairs federalism, scholars
have pointed out the practical difficulties of permitting states to develop
independent and potentially inconsistent foreign policies. They have argued
that the U.S. constitutional system is premised on the maintenance of "one
voice" with respect to matters affecting foreign affairs. Notwithstanding the
force of the "one voice" argument, this Part offers a pragmatic functional
defense of allowing a system of gubernatorial foreign policy to arise.
A. Building a Gubernatorial Foreign Policy Capacity
The very term "gubernatorial foreign policy" may seem paradoxical because
governors do not seem to have the capacity to handle the intricacies of foreign
policy. Although four out of the last five U.S. Presidents served as governors
prior to taking office,13° none of them claimed to have gained extensive
experience in foreign affairs during their terms as governor. But it is worth
noting that modern state executives are developing the capacity and experience
to participate directly in the flow and ebb of foreign relations.
For instance, a number of states have established overseas offices to
represent their particularized interests in countries of special importance.
Alabama, for instance, has established a field office in Heidelberg, Germany to
promote the state's image in Europe and to strengthen ties with German
automakers that have invested in the state.'31 Virginia has established similar
offices in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Japan to facilitate and
encourage trade with East Asia.
1 32
Some state offices overseas have a long history. Since 1971, the State of
Texas has operated a "Mexico Office" in Mexico City with the "goal of
130. Since 1976, the United States has elected four governors to the federal presidency: Jimmy
Carter (Georgia), Ronald Reagan (California), Bill Clinton (Arkansas), and George W.
Bush (Texas). The only non-governor elected was Reagan's Vice President, George H.W.
Bush, in 1988. Prior to 1976, no former governor had been elected since Franklin Roosevelt,
of New York, in 1944. Overall, however, it is striking that nineteen of the forty-three U.S.
Presidents served as governors prior to taking office as the chief foreign policy organ of the
United States. For a compilation of presidential statistics, see Christopher DeMuth,
Governors (and Generals) Rule, AM. ENTERPRISE, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 26, 29.
131. See NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS: A REVIEW OF RECENT
STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIWES 10 (2005), available at http://www.nga.org/
Files/pdf/ooCOMPETITVENESS.pdf.
132. Id. at 33-34.
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strengthening trade, investment and tourism ties between Texas and Mexico
markets with specific emphasis on benefiting small and medium sized Texas
businesses."'33
However, not all of these offices are focused merely on international
marketing and business issues. At least two states have established domestic
offices for the management of international relations generally. Maryland, for
instance, has created a "Subcabinet for International Affairs" to "coordinate
open communication and collaboration among state agencies regarding
international affairs for the State of Maryland."' 34 The State of Washington has
also established an "Office of International Relations and Protocol.
1 35
To be sure, such scattered developments hardly constitute a bureaucracy
comparable to the foreign policy capacity of the federal government. But the
yardstick for measuring the gubernatorial foreign policy capacity is not
whether governors will have more expertise than the federal government's
foreign policy bureaucracy. Plainly, governors will not. Rather, the question is
whether governors will have a greater capacity to take foreign policy actions
than would a state or federal court. In the traditional view, state governors are
excluded from foreign affairs activities, but federal and state courts are then
responsible for implementing U.S. obligations under a treaty, statute, or
executive agreement. When making this comparison, at least, there are some
reasons to believe that governors have a superior foreign policy capacity than
federal and state courts.
For instance, when considering whether and how to implement the ICJ's
judgment in Avena, Governor Henry and Oklahoma's highest criminal court
simultaneously considered the proper way to respond. The Oklahoma court
properly considered the effect of the consular rights treaty, the treaty
obligations to the ICJ, and the effect on Torres's case. But sitting as a court, it
could not consider the possible effects of noncompliance on Oklahoma's and
the United States' relationship with Mexico and the ICJ. Overall, the
Oklahoma court, like all courts, had a limited ability to gather information
133. State of Texas Mexico Office Website, http://www.tded.state.tx.us/mexico/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2006).
134. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2005.24, Robert Ehrlich, Governor of Maryland, Governor's
Subcabinet for International Affairs (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.governor.
maryland.gov/executiveorders/2oo5/oz4eo.html.
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.290.010 (1998). The office serves "as the state's official liaison and
protocol office with foreign governments." Id. Moreover, the director of the office is
appointed by and "shall serve at the pleasure of the governor." Id.
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beyond that particular case and to consider broader political relationships and
trends.' 6
By contrast, the governor's office had greater access to information
concerning the broader political context of the ICJ decision. It had the ability to
directly and privately communicate with representatives from the Mexican and
federal governments. This secrecy, combined with an ability to act with
dispatch, affords governors numerous advantages in resolving this and other
foreign policy issues that come within their limited purview.
B. Accommodating Globalization While Preserving Federalism
One might agree that governors have some limited foreign policy expertise
but still believe that a centralized, exclusive federal foreign policy system that
speaks with "one voice" would work more effectively. 137 The rise of
globalization has only heightened the argument for one voice. States, for
instance, have traditionally held independent authority to regulate such
matters as gambling, local health and safety, and criminal punishment. The
forces of globalization have exposed all of these areas to the prospect of
international regulation.
1" s
But it does not follow that internationalization requires nationalization. For
instance, globalization has placed U.S. criminal punishment policies under
international scrutiny. Both international courts and foreign governments have
sought to modify the administration of the death penalty in the United States.
The authority to change or modify those policies, however, lies primarily (and
perhaps exclusively) with state governments. The simplest and most direct
response to foreign government requests is action by the state governors in
question. There is no functional necessity to bring the federal government into,
for example, a dispute over Texas's process for hearing appeals of death
136. For a critique of courts in the administration of structural injunctions, see PETER H.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 150-84 (1983).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (invoking the one voice
argument to hold that an executive agreement preempts inconsistent state law); David M.
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception
of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) (defending the Supreme Court's decision
in Missouri v. Holland on historical grounds); id. at 1310 (characterizing as strikingly
irresponsible the possibility that states could have independent control to implement treaty
obligations).
138. For instance, state policies in all of these areas have been challenged as inconsistent with
international norms. See, e.g., Avena Judgment, supra note 1 (finding a treaty violation due
to the United States' failure to provide a judicial hearing to challenge the effect of a consular
rights violation on a capital punishment sentence).




sentences. The Governor of Texas can and does deal directly with foreign
governments and is perfectly capable of changing or adjusting his or her
policies in response to the foreign concerns. 139 Foreign governments are also
perfectly capable of directly expressing their concerns to state governors.
Supporters of "one voice" might respond that the foreign policy
consequences of Texas's actions might affect all Americans, and not just
Texans. This is a legitimate concern. But globalization has not only expanded
the subjects of international concern; it has raised the profile of sub-national
entities on the international stage. As Professor Spiro has argued, states have
begun to achieve a substantial international presence in their own right.4 ' The
globalization of communications, trade, and travel has made it more likely that
foreign nations can recognize the difference between a policy of the State of
Texas and a policy of the State of New York.'41
But even if gubernatorial actions abroad are not understood as the actions
of a particular state, there still might be a justification for permitting a system
of gubernatorial foreign policy. The need for one voice must be balanced
against the United States' continuing commitment to a system of federalism.
As globalization subjects more and more state policies to international scrutiny,
the traditional theory of one voice would lead to the eventual nationalization of
all of these areas of state policy.
One voice might be the most effective way to fulfill international goals, but
it also threatens the dual system of sovereignties that the Supreme Court has
gone to great pains to preserve. Moreover, as a political matter, the threat (real
or imagined) of international control over state policies operates as another
disincentive to U.S. participation in many international agreements.142 In the
long run, allowing the existence of a gubernatorial foreign policy operates as a
139. Whether the Governor wants to change the policy is a different question from whether he
can do so. See Texas To Ignore Court Order, supra note 38.
140. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1259-70 (1999)
(describing the rise of states as "demi-sovereigns"). Whether or not they are "demi-
sovereigns," the trend Professor Spiro described seems quite real.
141. To provide just one example of foreign retaliation against a particular state rather than the
whole United States, the United Kingdom adopted legislation retaliating against
corporations from political subdivisions that employed a tax method that harmed U.K.
corporations. See id. at 1266 n.166 (noting that retaliatory legislation by the United
Kingdom would have targeted only states rather than the entire foreign entity).
142. For instance, opponents of a number of human rights treaties have used the threat to states'
rights as basis for opposition. See, e.g., Richard G. Wilkins et al., Why the United States
Should Not Ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 411,
428-34 (2003) (arguing that implementation of the treaty by Congress would exceed federal
power over states).
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pragmatic constitutional compromise between the internationalizing demands
of globalization and the continuing conception of the United States as a federal
system. The federal government continues to retain its authority to enter into
international commitments, even commitments relating to matters that were
previously controlled by the state governments. But the federal government
leaves implementation of those obligations, along with the power to respond to
greater international scrutiny of state policies, to the state governments, and to
their chief executives in particular.
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this Essay is to give academic recognition to the
potentially significant role of governors in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.
Governors are increasingly responsible for dealing with demands from foreign
governments and international institutions. They negotiate and participate in
certain limited forms of international agreement. They also execute state
policies intended to impose sanctions on foreign countries. All of this
represents an emerging system of gubernatorial foreign policy characterized by
governors exercising independent decision-making power over matters
affecting the foreign policy of the entire United States.
The system of gubernatorial foreign policy I have described does not
conflict with traditional understandings of federal control over foreign affairs.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have retreated from claims of federal
exclusivity over foreign affairs and have shielded state officials from
commandeering by the federal government. This doctrinal framework has left
a small space for gubernatorial foreign policy, which the federal government
has expanded through its practice of relying on states to carry out foreign
policy obligations and by imposing limitations on the preemptive effects of
treaties and international agreements.
In my view, a system of gubernatorial foreign policy is the most practical
and feasible way to accommodate the internationalizing pressure of
globalization with the traditional conception of federalism still extant in U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence. The states will continue to improve their capacity
to deal with matters concerning foreign affairs that affect their traditional areas
of jurisdiction. The federal government will retain the right to preempt, but
not commandeer, state governments in the service of their foreign policy goals.
As states continue to expand and exert their improved foreign affairs capacity,
even this federal right to preempt may become less necessary so that, in the
future, the federal government will rely more and more on state governors to
carry out foreign affairs responsibilities. In this way, globalization and




federalism can both survive and prosper well into the Constitution's third
century.
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